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RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 Petitioner Gurson Oswald Gourzong, a native of 
Jamaica, was found by an immigration judge to be removable 
pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
because he had been “convicted of an aggravated felony”—
specifically, he had been convicted by a special court-martial 
of the United States military of having sexual intercourse with 
a person under the age of sixteen. The Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s Order. 
Gourzong now seeks review of the BIA’s Order. He contends 
that his conviction by a special court-martial does not render 
him removable, because convictions by special courts-martial 
categorically fall outside the definition of the term 
“conviction” found at Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). That definition provides in pertinent 
part that “[t]he term ‘conviction’ means, with respect to an 
alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a 
court . . . .” Id. Specifically, Gourzong contends that a special 
court-martial is not a “court” because there is a possibility 
that a special court-martial can convene without a legally 
trained judge presiding over it. We agree with the BIA that, as 
a general matter, convictions by special courts-martial qualify 
as convictions for purposes of the INA. Gourzong is therefore 
removable by reason of committing an aggravated felony 
within the meaning of the INA, and we thus lack jurisdiction 
to review the final Order of Removal. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review 
any final order of removal against an alien who is removable 
by reason of having committed a [covered] criminal offense 





 Gourzong was admitted to the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in 1983. In 1993, after having 
joined the United States military, he was convicted by a 
special court-martial convened at Camp Pendelton, 
California, of having violated Articles 90, 92, and 120 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), which, at that 
time, prohibited, respectively, willfully disobeying a lawful 
order, 10 U.S.C. § 890(2), failing to obey a lawful order, id. 
§ 892, and, most significantly for present purposes, 
“commit[ing] an act of sexual intercourse with a female not 
his wife who has not attained the age of sixteen years,” Act of 
Jan. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-460, § 920, 70A Stat. 1, 73 
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 920). The details of 
Gourzong’s conviction are sparse. The Administrative Record 
reflects that he was represented by counsel in the 
proceedings, A.R. 131, and that he pleaded guilty to the 
charges, A.R. 128, but reflects nothing specific about the 
factual bases for the charges or the composition of the court-
martial. But see infra note 6. 
 
 The members of the special court-martial imposed a 
sentence of six months confinement, loss of pay, and bad-
conduct discharge. A.R. 129. The convening authority, a 
Lieutenant Colonel of the United States Marine Corps, 
approved the sentence, but suspended a portion of the 
confinement term and withheld executing the bad-conduct 
discharge. A.R. 129. The bad-conduct-discharge sentence 
was ultimately executed, however, on August 22, 1996, after 
the appellate review procedures set forth in Article 71(c) of 




 The Department of Homeland Security brought 
removal proceedings against Gourzong in 2014, alleging that, 
because of his conviction by special court-martial, he was 
removable for having committed the aggravated felony of 
sexual abuse of a minor. A.R. 51. An Immigration Judge 
found Gourzong to be removable based both on his 
conviction of an aggravated felony and on his conviction of 
two or more crimes of moral turpitude—the second 
conviction being a 2006 conviction in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, for making 
terroristic threats.1 A.R. 51.  
 
 Gourzong appealed the Immigration Judge’s Order to 
the BIA, arguing that convictions by special courts-martial do 
not qualify as “convictions” as defined in § 101(a)(48)(A) the 
INA. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (“The term ‘conviction’ 
means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of 
the alien entered by a court . . . .”). In particular, he focused 
his argument on whether a special court-martial is a “court.” 
He relied upon language in the BIA’s opinion in Matter of 
Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 2008), in which 
the BIA, finding that convictions by general courts-martial do 
qualify as convictions under the INA, had stated that the term 
“court” means “a governmental body consisting of one or 
more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes and administer 
justice.” See id. at 487 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 378 
(8th ed. 2004)). Gourzong argued that, because a special 
court-martial can, under certain conditions, proceed without a 
                                              
 1 The Immigration Judge’s determination that 
Gourzong was convicted of two or more crimes of moral 
turpitude is not before us.  
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legally trained judge, a special court-martial is not a “court” 
under the INA.  
 
 A one-member panel of the BIA, in a non-precedential 
opinion, disagreed, finding that the differences between 
general and special courts-martial were not significant enough 
to warrant a different result from that in Rivera-Valencia. See 
A.R. 4-5. The BIA rejected Gourzong’s argument that the 
possibility of a lack of a legally trained judge placed 
convictions by special courts-martial outside the definition of 
“conviction” under the INA. The BIA instead concluded that 
special courts-martial were “genuine criminal proceeding[s]” 
given the procedural protections afforded to the accused and 
the role of special courts-martial in adjudging criminal 
penalties under the jurisdiction of the military. A.R. 5 
(“Consequently, we fail to find the possibility that a military 
judge may not be appointed by the convening authority to a 
special court-martial serves to diminish the effect and 
undermine the validity of the actions taken by the members of 
that adjudicative body, i.e., findings of a formal judgment of 
guilt entered in a genuine criminal proceeding pursuant to the 
governing laws of the United States Armed Forces, so as to 
qualify as a conviction for immigration purposes.”). 
Moreover, the BIA found the possibility that a special court-
martial could convene without a military judge to be 
mitigated by its rarity, and by the requirements in the Manual 
for Courts-Martial that (a) court-martial members be chosen 
on the basis of “age, education, training, experience, length of 
service, and judicial temperament,” and (b) “unless otherwise 
specified, the president of a special court-martial without a 
military judge has the same authority and responsibility as a 
military judge.” A.R. 5 (quoting Rules for Courts-Martial 
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(“RCM”) § 502(a)(1), 801(a)). Gourzong now seeks review 
of the BIA’s Order. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The Immigration Judge had jurisdiction over 
Gourzong’s removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the Immigration Judge’s 
Order of Removal under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 
1240.15.  
 
 We generally have jurisdiction to review final orders 
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), but that jurisdiction 
does not extend to review of “any final order of removal 
against an alien who is removable by reason of having 
committed [an aggravated felony],” id. § 1252(a)(2)(C). We 
have jurisdiction to determine whether this “necessary 
jurisdiction-stripping fact[]” is present here—that is, we have 
jurisdiction to determine whether Gourzong was convicted of 
committing an aggravated felony within the meaning of the 
INA insofar as it allows us to determine whether we have 
jurisdiction over his petition for review. See Borrome v. 
Attorney Gen. of U.S., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Because we ultimately conclude that Gourzong was convicted 
of committing an aggravated felony within the meaning of the 
INA, we lack jurisdiction over his petition for review.  
 
 Because the BIA’s written decision in this case was an 
unpublished, non-precedential decision issued by a single 
BIA member, to the extent it was interpreting statutes, we 
will not afford it Chevron deference. Mahn v. Attorney Gen. 
of U.S., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). Instead, those 
issues of statutory interpretation, along with other questions 
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of law, will be reviewed de novo. Id. To the extent the single-
member panel was interpreting BIA precedent, the standard 
of review is unsettled.2 However, because even under a de 
novo standard of review we agree with the single-member 






                                              
 2 We have not decided the extent of deference we 
owe—if any—to a single-member panel’s interpretations of 
prior BIA precedents (such as the opinion from Rivera-
Valencia). Other courts have adopted varying deferential 
standards. Compare Mansour v. Holder, 739 F.3d 412, 414 
(8th Cir. 2014) (finding that Auer deference is owed to single-
member BIA panel interpretations of BIA regulations); 
Aburto-Rocha v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(“An agency’s interpretation of its own precedents receives 
considerable deference—a form of deference that applies in 
equal measure to the BIA’s interpretation of its precedents.” 
(citations omitted) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 
(1997))); Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 131 
(2d Cir. 2005) (“The BIA’s determination that [a prior BIA 
precedent] does not apply . . . is a reasonable interpretation 
that merits deference.” (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))), with Lezama-Garcia v. 
Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 532 (9th Cir. 2011) (affording a single-




 We have never addressed the specific issue of whether 
convictions by special courts-martial can qualify as 
convictions that can render an alien removable under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA. Our resolution of this issue 
initially requires consideration of the different types of 
courts-martial in the military justice system. 
 
a. Classifications of Courts-Martial 
 Special courts-martial are one of three classifications 
of courts-martial that can try persons subject to the military’s 
jurisdiction: summary, special, and general. 10 U.S.C. § 816. 
Summary courts-martial have limited jurisdiction and are, as 
the name suggests, summary in nature. A summary court-
martial consists of a single commissioned officer, who 
presides over the proceedings, represents both the 
government and the accused, and makes the ultimate finding 
as to the accused’s guilt. See id. § 816; Middendorf v. Henry, 
425 U.S. 25, 41 (1976); RCM § 1301(b). A summary court-
martial has jurisdiction only if the accused does not object to 
trial by summary court-martial and, regardless, lacks 
jurisdiction to try “officers, cadets, aviation cadets, and 
midshipmen.” 10 U.S.C. § 820. Although summary courts-
martial may try persons for any noncapital offenses under the 
UCMJ, they may not impose “death, dismissal, dishonorable 
or bad-conduct discharge, confinement for more than one 
month, hard-labor without confinement for more than 45 
days, restriction to specified limits for more than two months, 
or forfeiture of more than two-thirds of one month’s pay.” Id. 
Given their limited jurisdiction and summary nature, 
convictions by summary courts-martial are not necessarily 
given weight outside the military justice system. For example, 
convictions by summary courts-martial are not counted when 
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determining a defendant’s criminal history under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(g). Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has determined that summary courts-
martial are not “criminal prosecution[s]” for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. See Middendorf, 425 
U.S. at 42. 
 
 General courts-martial are the classification of courts-
martial with the authority to impose the most severe 
punishments. General courts-martial consist of either “a 
military judge and not less than five members” or, if the 
accused so requests, “only a military judge,” 10 U.S.C. 
§ 816(1), and “have jurisdiction to try persons . . . for any 
offense made punishable [under the UCMJ] and may, under 
such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any 
punishment not forbidden by this chapter, including the 
penalty of death . . . .” Id. § 818(a). Courts are in wide 
agreement that convictions by general courts-martial receive 
the weight of equivalent convictions in the civilian system. 
See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, 807 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 
2015) (“[W]e hold that Shaffer’s conviction by general court-
martial is a conviction in ‘a court of the United States’ within 
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).”); United States v. Grant, 753 F.3d 480, 
484-85 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a conviction by a general 
court-martial can qualify as the predicate offense under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act); United States v. Martinez, 122 
F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that convictions by 
general courts-martial can serve as the predicate felonies for 
the felon-in-possession firearm prohibition at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1)); United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967, 970 
(9th Cir. 1993) (“We hold that a general court-martial is a 
‘court’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and a 
conviction, such as MacDonald’s, for which an individual is 
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punishable for a term exceeding one year, amounts to a 
‘crime’ for purposes of § 922(g)(1).”); Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. at 486-89 (holding that convictions by general 
courts-martial qualify as convictions under § 237 of the INA); 
see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(g) (“Sentences resulting from 
military offenses are counted if imposed by a general or 
special court-martial.”). Relatedly, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause bars federal prosecution for an offense previously 
tried before a general court-martial. See Shaffer, 807 F.3d at 
946-47 (“[C]ourt-martial conviction is a bar to successive 
federal prosecution.”); United States v. Stoltz, 720 F.3d 1127, 
1129 (9th Cir. 2013) (“If a servicemember is tried by general 
or special courtmartial, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment bars a subsequent civilian prosecution for 
the same offense.”). 
 
 Special courts-martial, which are at issue here, are 
similar to general courts-martial in their general jurisdiction, 
but they differ with respect to the penalties that can be 
imposed and with respect to their composition. They have 
“jurisdiction to try persons . . . for any noncapital offense 
made punishable by [the UCMJ] and, under such regulations 
as the President may prescribe, for capital offenses.” 10 
U.S.C. § 819. However, they may not impose the penalties of 
“death, dishonorable discharge, dismissal, confinement for 
more than one year, hard labor without confinement for more 
than three months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds pay 
per month, or forfeiture of pay for more than one year.” Id.3 
                                              
 3 Although not material to our analysis, this current 
version of 10 U.S.C. § 819 differs slightly from the version in 
effect on the date of Gourzong’s conviction. At the time of 
his conviction, a special court-martial could not impose 
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Special courts-martial consist of either (a) “not less than three 
members”; (b) “a military judge and not less than three 
members;” or (c) only a military judge if the accused so 
requests. 10 U.S.C. § 816(2). Moreover: 
 
A bad-conduct discharge, confinement for more 
than six months, or forfeiture of pay for more 
than six months may not be adjudged unless a 
complete record of the proceedings and 
testimony has been made, counsel . . . was 
detailed to represent the accused, and a military 
judge was detailed to the trial, except in any 
case in which a military judge could not be 
detailed to the trial because of physical 
conditions or military exigencies. In any such 
case in which a military judge was not detailed 
to the trial, the convening authority shall make a 
detailed written statement, to be appended to the 
record, stating the reason or reasons a military 
judge could not be detailed. 
 
Id. § 819. Notably, convictions by special courts-martial, like 
convictions by general courts-martial, are counted when 
determining a defendant’s criminal history under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(g) (“Sentences 
resulting from military offenses are counted if imposed by a 
                                                                                                     
confinement of more than six months or forfeiture of pay for 
more than six months. See National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 577, 113 
Stat. 512, 625 (1999). Under the amended statute, the 
penalties of confinement and forfeiture of pay can extend up 
to one year. Id.  
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general or special court-martial.”). Moreover, as the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “[i]t is also well settled 
that a general or special court-martial precludes a subsequent 
civilian criminal prosecution for the same offense.” Stoltz, 
720 F.3d at 1128. 
 
b. Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA 
 Since we must determine whether Gourzong was 
convicted of an aggravated felony, we consider the issue of 
first impression: whether judgments of guilt by special courts-
martial are “convictions” under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the 
INA. We have previously addressed what “factors may be 
relevant in deciding whether a finding of guilt constitutes a 
conviction” under § 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA. See Castillo v. 
Attorney Gen. U.S., 729 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 2013). In 
Castillo, the petitioner had been charged with removability 
under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, which, like 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), requires a showing that an alien has been 
“convicted” of a crime. Castillo, 729 F.3d at 298. The 
petitioner contended that his conviction for shoplifting by a 
municipal court was not a conviction purposes of the INA 
because he had been convicted only of a “disorderly persons 
offense” under New Jersey law—that is, a petty offense for 
which he had no right to trial by jury or indictment by a grand 
jury. Id. at 299. Setting aside whether the disorderly persons 
offense constituted a “crime” under the pertinent part of the 
INA, we examined what characteristics of a proceeding bring 
its convictions under the definition of “conviction” in 
§ 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA. See Castillo, 729 F.3d at 302 n.1 
(leaving open the question “conviction of what[?]” for 
remand). In so doing, we rejected a narrow approach that 
looked only to a single factor—namely, whether the 
14 
 
conviction required proof of each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt4—and, instead, adopted an “open-ended 
inquiry” as to whether the judgment of guilt was “entered in a 
. . . genuine criminal proceeding.” See id. at 307. We pointed 
to several relevant factors, “including how the prosecuting 
jurisdiction characterized the offense at issue, the 
consequences of a finding of guilt, and the rights available to 
the accused as well as any other characteristics of the 
proceeding itself.” Id.  
 
 The single-member panel of the BIA in this case 
applied this open-ended approach in determining whether a 
conviction by special court-martial can be a “conviction” 
under § 101(a)(48)(a). In so doing, the BIA relied heavily 
upon the BIA’s precedential opinion in Matter of Rivera-
Valencia. In Rivera-Valencia, the BIA found, after analyzing 
the characteristics of general courts-martial and the 
procedural protections they offer, that a general court-martial 
is a “‘genuine criminal proceeding’, that is, a proceeding that 
is ‘criminal in nature under the governing laws of the 
prosecuting jurisdiction.’” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 486-87 (quoting 
Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 688 (BIA 2004)); 
see also Castillo, 729 F.3d at 308 (citing Rivera-Valencia 
approvingly). The BIA here found that “the differences 
between a general court-martial[] and a special court-martial 
                                              
 4 As we noted in Castillo, that each element must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a proceeding to qualify as a “genuine 
criminal proceeding.” Id. at 307. A decision maker must 
undertake an “open-ended inquiry” of the other characteristics 
of the proceeding to determine if it qualifies as a “genuine 
criminal proceeding.” Id. 
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are not so significant so as to warrant a different result” from 
that in Rivera-Valencia. See A.R. 4-5. The BIA here noted 
that a judgment of guilt under a special court-martial, as 
under a general court-martial, must be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that accused persons before a special 
court-martial have the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to representation by counsel at public 
expense, and the right to call witnesses and present evidence. 
See id. We agree with the BIA’s conclusion that convictions 
by special courts-martial are, as a general matter, convictions 
within the meaning of § 101(a)(48)(A).5 
                                              
 5 We note that factors beyond those cited by the BIA 
below buttress the conclusion that special courts-martial are, 
as a general matter, “genuine criminal proceeding[s].” See 
Castillo, 729 F.3d at 307; see also Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 31 
(“General and special courts-martial resemble judicial 
proceedings . . . .”). The offenses triable by special court-
martial include every noncapital offense triable by general 
court-martial, and are characterized by the military (through 
federal statute) as “punitive”—i.e., criminal—offenses. See 
10 U.S.C. § 819 (special courts-martial have jurisdiction to 
try “any noncapital offense made punishable by [the 
UCMJ]”); 10 U.S.C. § 866 (providing for review of certain 
sentences by a “Court of Criminal Appeals” (emphasis 
added)); Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-391, 70A Stat. 
1, 64 (codified at 10 U.S.C § 877 et seq.) (titling the 
subchapter “Punitive Articles”). Also, even though the 
consequences of a finding of guilt by a special court-martial 
differ in degree from those that can be imposed by a general 
court-martial, they can include (at the time of Gourzong’s 
conviction) up to six months’ confinement and severe 
16 
 
 Gourzong notes that the BIA did not acknowledge or 
refer to Rivera-Valencia’s view as to the ordinary meaning of 
the word “court” as “a governmental body consisting of one 
or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes and administer 
justice,” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 487, and urges that the BIA thus 
improperly departed from precedent without explanation. Cf. 
Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Although an agency can change or adapt its policies, it acts 
arbitrarily if it departs from its established precedents without 
announcing a principled reason for the departure.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). He urges, further, that Rivera-
Valencia’s view as to the meaning of “court” controls here 
and that, because of the possibility that a special court-martial 
can convene without a legally trained judge, we must 
therefore grant his petition for review.  
 
 We disagree. First, Rivera-Valencia was not so 
limited. The BIA in Rivera-Valencia offered its view as to 
what constitutes a “court” in the context of rejecting an 
argument, similar to the one made here, that sought to cut 
through the open-ended inquiry and focus instead on a limited 
understanding of the word “court.” It is not clear that this 
discussion was necessary to the BIA’s conclusion that 
convictions by general courts-martial meet the definition in 
§ 101(a)(48)(A). See Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 488 
(“[T]his Board has from its earliest days considered 
judgments entered by courts-martial, both domestic and 
foreign, to be valid ‘convictions’ for immigration purposes. 
We see nothing in the language of section 101(a)(48)(A) that 
would lead us to conclude that Congress intended to modify 
                                                                                                     
financial penalties—penalties prototypical of those imposed 
by criminal courts. See 10 U.S.C. § 819.  
17 
 
this historical understanding by limiting the term ‘court’ to 
those organized under Article III of the Constitution or its 
counterparts under State law.” (citations omitted)). More 
fundamentally, though, the BIA’s view in Rivera-Valencia 
that a court is “a governmental body consisting of one or 
more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes and administer 
justice,” id. at 487 (alterations omitted), does not resolve the 
question here of whether special courts-martial are, as a 
general matter, courts—after all, a typical special court-
martial is presided over by a military judge, and all special 
courts-martial “sit to adjudicate disputes and administer 
justice.” 6 Even in the instances when special courts-martial 
                                              
 6 A study of the record and the UCMJ reveals that 
Gourzong’s court-martial more than likely was presided over 
by a military judge given that he was adjudged a bad conduct 
discharge that was approved and eventually executed. See 10 
U.S.C. § 819 (“A bad-conduct discharge . . . may not be 
adjudged unless . . . a military judge was detailed to the trial, 
except in any case in which a military judge could not be 
detailed to the trial because of physical conditions or military 
exigencies.”). It is unlikely that “physical conditions or 
military exigencies” prevented the detailing of a military 
judge to Camp Pendelton, California, see A.R. 128, and, 
besides, there is no “detailed written statement . . . appended 
to the record, stating the reason or reasons a military judge 
could not be detailed,” 10 U.S.C. § 819.  
 Notably, the bad conduct discharge was not executed 
immediately by the convening authority because it first had to 
meet the requirements of Article 71(c) of the UCMJ, see A.R. 
130, which provides that the bad conduct discharge cannot 
“be executed until there is a final judgment as to the legality 
of the proceedings . . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 871(c)(1). “A judgment 
18 
 
lack a military judge, they have a president with, in general, 
“the same authority and responsibility as a military judge,” as 
the single-member panel of the BIA noted below. See A.R. 5 
(quoting RCM 801(a)). 
 
 More importantly, however, the BIA correctly 
identified several characteristics of special courts-martial that 
compel finding that they, like general courts-martial, are 
typically “genuine criminal proceedings.” See A.R. 4-5 
(finding that “the differences between a general court-
martial[] and a special court-martial are not so significant so 
as to warrant a different result” from that in Rivera-Valencia). 
Gourzong’s argument fails because its focus on a single factor 
contravenes the open-ended approach we adopted in Castillo 
and that was actually applied by the BIA in Rivera-Valencia. 
In Castillo, we were examining how to determine if the 
definition of “conviction” found at § 101(a)(48)(A) of the 
INA has been met—that is, how to determine whether “a 
formal judgment of guilt [was] entered by a court.” We 
determined that the correct analysis for determining whether 
there was a “formal judgment of guilt . . . entered by a court” 
is to conduct an open-ended inquiry into whether the finding 
of guilt came in a “genuine criminal proceeding.” Castillo, 
729 F.3d at 306-07. Thus, we are satisfied that special courts-
martial are, as a general matter, courts, given the 
characteristics of their proceedings as examined under our 
                                                                                                     
as to legality of the proceedings is final in such cases when 
review is completed by a Court of Criminal Appeals,” unless 
appellate review was waived or the appeal withdrawn. Id. 
This procedural protection via appellate review reaffirms our 
confidence that Gourzong’s conviction by special court-
martial qualifies as a conviction under § 101(a)(48)(A). 
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open inquiry: the manner in which the military (as authorized 
by Congress) characterizes them, the consequences of a 
finding of guilt, the rights available to the accused, and the 
other characteristics of the proceedings. These are the same 
factors that the BIA looked to in Rivera-Valencia, and the 
same ones applied by the BIA below. See Rivera-Valencia, 24 
I. & N. Dec. at 487-89 (finding that proceedings before 
general courts-martial are “genuine criminal proceeding[s]” 
because, among other factors, convictions by general courts-
martial are characterized as “criminal” by the laws of the 
United States military, because general courts-martial have 
the authority to “finally determine any case over which they 
have jurisdiction,” and because general courts-martial offer 
significant procedural protections offered to the accused). We 
therefore find that the single-member panel of the BIA 
correctly concluded that Gourzong was convicted of an 
aggravated felony within the meaning of the definition of 
“conviction” in § 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA.7 
                                              
 7 We do not foreclose the possibility that an alien 
could demonstrate that his or her particular special court-
martial lacked many of the characteristics of a “genuine 
criminal proceeding” under the open-ended inquiry such that 
his or her specific judgment of guilt by a special court martial 
should not be considered to be a “conviction” under 
§ 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA. Gourzong, however, has made 
no showing that his special court-martial lacked any of the 
factors that we have deemed relevant under the open-ended 
inquiry, such as “how the prosecuting jurisdiction 
characterized the offense at issue, the consequences of a 
finding of guilt, and the rights available to the accused as well 
as any other characteristics of the proceeding itself.” Cf. 




 Because we agree with the BIA that convictions by 
special courts-martial are, as a general matter, convictions for 
purposes of § 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, we conclude that we 
lack jurisdiction over Gourzong’s petition for review. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to 
review any final order of removal against an alien who is 
removable by reason of having committed a [covered] 
criminal offense.”). We will therefore dismiss his petition for 
review.8 
                                              
 8 The panel wishes to express its thanks to the 
Shagin Law Group and Craig R. Shagin, Esquire, for 
agreeing to serve as pro bono counsel and for their 
excellent advocacy on behalf of Mr. Gourzong. 
    
Gourzong v. Attorney General of the United States, No. 
15-2645, dissenting. 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Gourzong was not “convicted of an aggravated felony 
within the meaning of the definition of ‘conviction’ in § 
101(a)(48)(A) of the INA.”  (Maj. Op. at 19.)  This statutory 
definition incorporates two basic requirements:  (1) “a formal 
judgment of guilt” of the alien—(2) entered by a “court.”  
Regardless of whether or not Gourzong’s special court-
martial satisfied the first requirement (a question I need not—
and do not—decide), it clearly did not meet the second 
requirement under the BIA’s own precedential interpretation 
of the term “court.”  Simply put, a special court-martial does 
not constitute “a governmental body consisting of one or 
more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes and administer 
justice” where—in place of a legally trained and certified 
military judge detailed by an assigned military judge and 
ultimately answerable to the Judge Advocate General—an 
active duty member of the United States Armed Forces, who 
is chosen by the convening authority, returns to his or her 
regular military duties once the proceeding is concluded, and 
need not (and most likely would not) possess any legal or 
judicial training or experience, presides over the special 
court-martial.  Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent. 
 
 The majority does not mention the government’s 
history of changing its positions throughout the course of this 
immigration proceeding—or its failure to brief the merits of 
Gourzong’s petition for review when it should have.  After 
Gourzong appealed to the BIA, the government requested 
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summary affirmance, asserting that the issues on appeal were 
squarely controlled by existing precedent, did not involve the 
application of precedent to novel facts, and were not so 
substantial as to warrant a written opinion.  It asked in the 
alternative for affirmance in a brief one-member decision, and 
the BIA actually dismissed the administrative appeal in such a 
non-precedential fashion.  Nevertheless, the government, in 
lieu of filing a brief on the merits, then asked this Court to 
remand for the BIA “to further consider its finding that a 
special court-martial, with or without a military judge present, 
satisfies the conventional definition of a ‘court’ such that a 
conviction by special court-martial, regardless of whether a 
military judge is present, qualifies as a conviction under the 
[INA]” and to determine whether there was any evidence in 
the record indicating that a military judge was not present 
(Respondent’s Motion to Remand at 1).  See, e.g., Borrome v. 
Attorney General, 687 F.3d 150, 156 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“Now the Government is singing a different tune. . . . The 
BIA had the opportunity to consider the issues and, at the 
Government’s insistence, chose not to do so.”).  The Court 
ordered the government to brief the merits, but the 
government’s cursory brief merely reiterates the same 
arguments for remand it had set forth in the motion.  
Threatened with sanctions (and represented by new counsel), 
the government finally submitted a real merits brief.  In this 
second brief, the government drastically changes its whole 
approach by withdrawing the remand requests and by 
indicating that the Court need not even consider Chevron 
deference principles, even though the government had 
emphasized this doctrine in its earlier submissions.  While I 
appreciate the apologies offered by the Department of 
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Justice’s attorney, I remain troubled by the government’s 
conduct in this case. 
 
 This matter, in turn, should be decided based on the 
administrative record now before the Court, i.e., on the basis 
of a special court-martial conducted without a military judge.  
The majority may well be correct that a military judge is 
typically detailed to preside over a special court-martial.  
Nevertheless, we should still focus on what the government 
has shown actually happened in Gourzong’s own special 
court-martial—and not what usually happens in such 
proceedings either now or when his court-martial convened in 
November of 1993 and January of 1994.  Simply put, I do not 
believe that the government has established that any military 
judge was detailed to preside over a special court-martial that 
occurred more than twenty years ago.  The rather meager 
record contained no clear references to a military judge.  In 
fact, the IJ relied on his own personal experience as a former 
special court-martial judge to opine on the record that a 
military judge was detailed here.  As Gourzong’s able pro 
bono counsel explains, “[t]he IJ, far from requiring DHS to 
prove by clear, convincing and unambiguous evidence each 
and every element necessary to support an order of 
deportation, Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966), 
merely assumed evidence not in the record and for which 
petitioner had no means to rebut.”  (Petitioner’s Brief at 5.)  
As the government likewise notes, “the Board held that a 
conviction by special court-martial, with or without a military 
judge present, qualifies as a conviction by a ‘court’ under the 
INA.”  (Respondent’s First Brief at 8 (emphasis added) 
(citing AR4-AR5).)   
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 The majority places particular emphasis on this 
Court’s ruling in Castillo v. Attorney General, 729 F.3d 296 
(3d Cir. 2013), and the open-ended notion of a “genuine 
criminal proceeding.”  However, § 101(a)(48)(A) actually 
defines “a conviction” as, inter alia, “a formal judgment of 
guilt of the alien entered by a court” (or, if adjudication has 
been withheld, where (1) “a judge” or jury has found the alien 
guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a 
finding of guilt, and (2) “the judge” has ordered some form of 
punishment, penalty, or restraint).  The “genuine criminal 
proceeding” approach represents an interpretation of the 
“formal judgment of guilt” requirement—not the “court” 
requirement.  The BIA specifically explained that “‘a far 
more sensible reading of the statute exists:  namely, that by 
“judgment of guilt” Congress most likely intended to refer to 
a judgment in a criminal proceeding.’”  Id. at 304 (quoting In 
re Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 687 (BIA 2004) (en 
banc)).  Our ruling in Castillo likewise did not specifically 
address this “court” language.  On the contrary, we assumed 
that the New Jersey Municipal Court constituted a “court” 
under the terms of the immigration statute.  In fact, we 
repeatedly referred to a “court” throughout our discussion of 
BIA case law and the “genuine criminal proceeding” 
approach.  See, e.g., id. at 307 (“However, this does not mean 
that a judgment was entered in a true or genuine criminal 
proceeding—and therefore constituted a conviction pursuant 
to § 1101(a)(48)(A)—merely because a court entered a 
formal judgment of guilt under the requisite ‘reasonable 
doubt’ standard of proof and imposed a form of punishment.” 
(emphasis added)).  In its precedential decision in In re 
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Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 2008), the BIA 
expressly distinguished the “genuine criminal proceeding” 
inquiry from the question of “whether that adjudication of 
guilt was entered by a ‘court,’” id. at 487.1  As the IJ 
recognized in the current proceeding, “[t]he Board broke its 
analysis down into the two requirements under 101(a)(48)(A):  
(1) a formal judgment of guilt of the alien; (2) entered by a 
court.”  (AR52 (citing Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 
486-88).) 
 
 Given the statutory language as well as the existing 
case law, the BIA’s ruling in this case should not be upheld 
merely because we may agree that, like general courts-
martial, special courts-martial “are typically ‘genuine 
criminal proceedings.’”  (Maj. Op. at 18 (citing AR4-AR5).)  
In other words, it is not enough to point out that the 
prosecution must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or 
highlight the various rights possessed by the accused in a 
special court-martial proceeding.  In fact, such an approach 
would render superfluous the statutory “court” language.  
See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“It is a well known canon of statutory construction 
that courts should construe statutory language to avoid 
interpretations that would render any phrase superfluous.” 
(citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001))). 
 
Just as it purported to define “a formal judgment of 
                                                 
1 In Castillo, we omitted from our discussion of Rivera-
Valencia the BIA’s own interpretation of the term “court.”  See 
Castillo, 729 F.3d at 308.   
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guilt” as a judgment entered in a genuine criminal 
proceeding, see, e.g. Castillo, 729 F.3d at 302-311 (reviewing 
BIA case law beginning with Eslamizar), the agency adopted 
its own definition of a “court” in Rivera-Valencia.  
Recognizing that the INA “does not define the term ‘court,’” 
the BIA gave “the word its ordinary, contemporary, and 
common meaning:  ‘[a] governmental body consisting of one 
or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes and administer 
justice.’”  Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 487 (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary 378 (8th ed. 2004)).).  Determining 
that a general court-martial satisfied this conventional 
definition, the BIA observed, inter alia, that a military judge 
presides over each general court-martial.  Id.  It specifically 
noted that “[a] military judge must be a member of a Federal 
or State bar whose qualifications for judicial duty have been 
certified by the Judge Advocate General for his or her 
particular branch of the service.”  Id. at 488 n.3 (citing 10 
U.S.C. § 826(b)).  In its non-precedential disposition 
dismissing Gourzong’s administrative appeal, the BIA did not 
even mention this definition—which, in contrast, was set 
forth in a precedential agency decision.  An administrative 
agency acts arbitrarily if it departs from an established 
precedent without providing a principled reason for its 
departure.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 
(3d Cir. 2002).  The majority attempts to minimize this 
definition by indicating that it may have been dicta offered in 
the context of rejecting an argument “that sought to cut 
through the open-ended inquiry and focus instead on a limited 
understanding of the word ‘court.’”  (Maj. Op. at 16.)  
However, I have already explained why I believe this “open-
ended inquiry” really implicates the “formal judgment of 
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guilt” requirement.  Exercising its expertise in matters of 
immigration law, the BIA clearly—and appropriately—noted 
that the INA does not define the meaning of the term “court,” 
adopted the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of 
this term, and then applied this general definition in the 
context of a general court-martial (which, according to the 
BIA as well as the majority, shares several similarities with a 
special court-martial).  See, e.g., Castillo, 729 F.3d at 302 
(“‘On the other hand, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”’” (quoting Acosta v. Ashcroft, 
341 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003))).  I fail to see why the 
agency (or this Court) should not apply the same definition 
here.2 
 
A special court-martial clearly does not constitute “a 
governmental body consisting of one or more judges who sit 
to adjudicate disputes and administer justice” where a special 
court-martial member presides in place of a military judge.  
The majority asserts that, “[e]ven in the instances when 
special courts-martial lack a military judge, they have a 
president with, in general, ‘the same authority and 
responsibility as a military judge,’ as the single-member panel 
of the BIA noted below.”  (Maj. Op. at 17-18 (quoting AR5).)  
                                                 
2  The majority observes that we have yet to decide whether 
Auer deference should be accorded to a single-member’s 
interpretation of prior BIA precedent.  I note that the government 
does not invoke this specific doctrine (and, on the contrary, 
indicates in its second brief that we need not even consider the 
Chevron doctrine).      
 8 
However, as Gourzong explains in some detail, the president 
of a special court-martial is no real substitute for a military 
judge. 
 
On the one hand, military judges (as the BIA 
specifically noted in Rivera-Valencia) are licensed attorneys 
certified for judicial duty by the respective Judge Advocate 
General.  Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 488 n.3.  “The 
military judge of a general court-martial shall be designated 
by the Judge Advocate General, or his designee, of the armed 
force of which the military judge is a member for detail in 
accordance with regulations.”  10 U.S.C. § 826(c).  Pursuant 
to the Manual for Courts-Martial, a military judge is detailed 
“by a person assigned as a military judge and directly 
responsible to the Judge Advocate General or the Judge 
Advocate General’s designee.”  R.C.M. § 503(b)(1).  A 
commissioned officer certified as qualified for duty as a 
military judge of a general court-martial “may perform such 
duties only when he is assigned and directly responsible to 
the Judge Advocate General, or his designee” and may 
perform other duties as assigned by or with the approval of 
the Judge Advocate General (or designee).  10 U.S.C. § 
826(c).  The military judge may be changed by an authority 
competent to detail the military judge without cause before 
the court-martial is assembled or, after assembly, on account 
of disqualification or for good cause shown.  R.C.M. § 
505(e).  “The convening authority may not prepare or review 
any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency 
of a military judge detailed to a special court-martial which 
relates to the performance of duty as a military judge.”  
R.C.M. § 104(b)(2)(B); see also id. (stating that when military 
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judge is normally rated or the military judge’s report is 
reviewed by convening authority, manner in which such 
military judge will be rated or evaluated upon performance of 
duty as military judge may be prescribed in regulations which 
shall ensure absence of command influence); 10 U.S.C. § 
826(c) (stating that, unless court-martial was convened by 
President or respective Secretary, convening authority is 
prohibited from preparing or reviewing any report on 
effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of detailed military judge 
relating to performance as military judge).  In the end, the 
respective Judge Advocate General has responsibility for the 
professional supervision of military judges.  See, e.g., R.C.M. 
§ 109(a). 
 
On the other hand, the court-martial members are 
either active duty commissioned officers, warrant officers, or 
enlisted persons.  R.C.M. § 502(a)(1).  They are detailed by 
“the convening authority” as, “in his opinion are best 
qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, training, 
experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.”  10 
U.S.C. § 825(d)(2).  While the convening authority is 
prohibited from considering or evaluating the members’ 
performance of duty as a court-martial member in the 
preparation of an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report or 
any other document used to determine advancements, 
transfer, or retention, R.C.M. § 104(b)(1), the convening 
authority may, before the court-martial is assembled, change 
the members without showing cause (and delegate to the staff 
judge advocate, legal officer, or other principal assistant to 
the convening authority the power to excuse a certain number 
of members without cause), R.C.M. § 505(c)(1)(A), (B).  
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After assembly, the convening authority may excuse 
members for good cause shown on the record.  R.C.M. § 
505(c)(2)(A)(i).  In turn, the highest-ranking member of the 
special court-martial serves as its president.  R.C.M. § 
502(b)(1). 
 
Without impugning his or her intelligence, experience, 
or impartiality, it is clear that the president of a special court-
martial would typically lack the legal (and judicial) training 
and experience possessed by a military judge.  After all, 
would a logistics officer (Gourzong was assigned to a motor 
transport battalion) really have any experience or knowledge 
dealing with the sorts of legal issues that judges are regularly 
expected to decide, such as evidentiary issues?  Likewise, a 
military judge is in large part insulated from the regular 
command structure insofar as he or she is specifically 
certified for judicial duties by the Judge Advocate General, is 
detailed by an assigned military judge, and is ultimately 
answerable to the Judge Advocate General.  However, the 
president and the other special court-martial members are 
active duty officers and enlisted persons specifically chosen 
by the convening authority—who even makes this choice 
based on the authority’s own assessment of their respective 
qualifications.  Even if they attempt to remain impartial, 
could such members—who return to their regular military 
duties once the special court-martial is concluded—really be 
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compared to professional and independent judicial officers?3  
 
Accordingly, I would grant the petition for review.      
 
                                                 
3 I further note that the other members of the special court-
martial can object to the president’s rulings on interlocutory 
questions of fact, and the president is authorized to consult with his 
or her fellow members before making a decision on such matters.  
R.C.M. § 801(e)(2)(B), (3)(D).  The president, in turn, deliberates 
with the other special court-martial members to determine whether 
the accused is proved guilty.  R.C.M. § 502(a)(2).  Accordingly, a 
court-martial president actually appears to represent a sort of 
amalgamation of a civilian judge and jury foreperson.  Like their 
civilian counterparts (who do not participate in jury deliberations), 
military judges do not vote with the court-martial members and are 
prohibited from consulting with the members except in the 
presence of the accused and respective counsel.  10 U.S.C. § 
826(c).  Likewise, their legal and interlocutory rulings are not 
subject to member review.  R.C.M. § 801(e)(1)(A).   
